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CASENOTES

FLORIDA STAR v. B.J.F.:* THE RAPE OF THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The United States Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment's protection of a free press' encompasses the media's
right to print truthful information that has been legally obtained.2
* Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
1. The Bill of Rights guarantees the freedom of the press to all citizens through
the first amendment. This amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of... the press." U. S. CONST. amend. I. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment makes the first amendment's freedom of press
mandate applicable to the states. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent
part: "No State shall make any law or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1924). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11-2 to 11-3 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the incorporation of the Bill of Rights).
2. The Supreme Court has primarily heard cases dealing with defamatory false-

hoods. See e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (plaintiff must
offer concrete evidence in determining whether actual malice exists); Gertz v. Robert

Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (plaintiff must show publisher to be at fault when
liability not based upon a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false reports on matters of public
interest gain constitutional protection absent proof of media's knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (criticism of
public officials is not subject to criminal libel sanctions in absence of knowingly false
statements); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public plaintiff
must show media had knowledge of falsity before liability will be imposed). Defamation cases involve the truthfulness of the information published by the media and
whether the defamed plaintiff is a public or private figure. The Supreme Court has
held that a public figure must show malice on the part of the media before he can
recover for defamation. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This
holding is consistent with the belief that erroneous statements are inevitable in free
debate and must be protected if such debate is to survive. Id.
However, Florida Star v. B.J.F. is not consistent with the case law on defamation. Florida Star does not deal with a defamatory falsehood but instead deals with
an invasion of one's privacy through the publication of a private fact. The state of the
law in this area is somewhat uncharted. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607
n.5 (1989). However, in the past fifteen years the Supreme Court has prohibited a
state from imposing liability on the media for publishing truthful information that is
legally obtained in a public forum. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1978) (newspaper learned of juvenile offender's identity from monitoring po-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:731

In Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court addressed the issue of whether a
state may protect sexual offense victims by invoking the right to privacy" to prohibit the media from publishing the victims' names. The
lice radio and interviewing eyewitnesses); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975) (reporter discovered name of rape victim from indictment documents
available in open court proceeding); Note, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Requiem] (elements of the privacy tort and vague and confusing concept of
newsworthiness); Note, Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension, 18 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 949 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Privacy and the Press] (press and privacy rights
create a necessary system of checks and balances).
Unlike defamation, suits for an invasion of privacy do not turn upon whether the
plaintiff is a public or private figure, but whether the privacy interest the state is
trying to protect rises to the level of a state interest of the highest order. The Supreme Court has employed this language in its strict scrutiny test under the' fourteenth amendment. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1988) (statute invokes strict scrutiny when it interferes with fundamental right or
discriminates against suspect class); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (racial classifications call for strict judicial scrutiny). The strict
scrutiny test applied under the fourteenth amendment and the civil rights statutes
carefully weighs the state's asserted interest against the right infringed upon by the
statute. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-6, at 1451-54 (discussing the strict scrutiny
standard).
3. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
4. The common law tort of privacy was "born" in 1890 when Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis wrote an article on the subject. Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis recognized a theory of
legal redress for a violation of one's right "to be let alone." Id. at 193. They wrote the
article in response to disconcerting and intrusive reports about Warren's daughter's
wedding that the local society column published. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 383-84 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy]. Apparently, the local newspapers
"had a field day." Id.
Since Warren and Brandeis first recognized the right to privacy, the concept has
expanded into four distinct torts: (1) the unreasonable intrusion into seclusion; (2)
public disclosure of a private fact; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) the appropriation of name or likeness. Id. at 389-407. Although these four distinct torts seem
incongruous, their common thread is a person's right to be let alone. See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
AND KEETON] (general discussion of the privacy torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652A (1977) (introduction to the privacy torts). See also L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, §§ 15-2 to 15-4, at 1304-14 (discussing the development of privacy); Trubow,
Information Law Overview, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815 (1985) (commenting on privacy torts' effect on modern day technology).
Unreasonable intrusion into seclusion involves an intrusion into a person's solitude that a reasonable person would find objectionable. Prosser, Privacy, supra, at
389-92. See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (photographer intruded upon public figure's seclusion by constant harassment). As long as information
is obtained in a manner that a reasonable person would find intrusive, no other element is necessary to fulfill this tort. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (tort of intrusion upon seclusion is complete when information is obtained in an
intrusive manner), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (discussing tort of intrusion upon seclusion).
On the other hand, three elements are necessary to complete the tort for public
disclosure of a private fact: (1) the disclosure must be public, not private; (2) the facts
disclosed must be private; and (3) the matter made public must be highly objectionable to the reasonable person. Prosser, Privacy, supra, at 392-98. See Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (reporter published facts about surfer's life not
relevant to involvement in sport); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
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Court, applying a prior ruling,5 held that the right to privacy cannot
1940) (former child prodigy's later life as an unknown disclosed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (discussing elements necessary to complete the tort for
public disclosure of a private fact); Note, Requiem, supra note 2, at 291 (discussing
the elements of the private-facts tort). All three of these elements must be met before
public disclosure of a private fact is actionable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D (1977). In addition, the Restatement of Torts requires that the information
not be of legitimate interest to the general public. Id.
The third distinct tort, placing a person in a false light in the public eye, involves
two elements: (1) the false light must be highly offensive to the reasonable person;
and (2) the actor must have acted with reckless disregard to the false nature of the

publicized material.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652E (1977). See also Can-

trell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (false story causing public sympathy
for plaintiffs held to be invasion of privacy); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(Supreme Court recognized the false light tort); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, at 86366 (discussion and review of false light tort); W. ZELERMEYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY
113-22 (1973) (discussing the invasion of privacy by newspapers and magazines).
Finally, the fourth privacy tort involves the appropriation of a person's name or

likeness for the defendant's use.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652C (1977). The

interest protected is the person's exclusive use of his own identity. Id. In addition to
the four distinct common law torts, the Supreme Court has recognized a zone of privacy in the penumbras of the Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965) (penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments lead
to conclusion that there is constitutional zone of privacy). As yet, however, it is uncertain whether this zone of privacy is also a right of privacy that will enjoy the same
protection as enumerated rights. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to
choose to have an abortion) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to choose
partner in marriage and other related aspects) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right of married persons to use contraceptives) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (education and discipline of children) with Department
of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989) (media's request for rap sheet was an invasion of privacy) and California v. Greenwood,
108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (no right of privacy in garbage) and
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 346 (1967) (eavesdropping on telephone is an invasion
of privacy).
The Court has recognized marriage and other family matters to be of paramount
constitutional importance and allowed a penumbral right to protect the integrity of a
person's physical being. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (a woman has control over her own
body in the early part of pregnancy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (a married couple can
choose to practice birth control). However, the Court has refused to extend this protection to matters outside of procreation and marriage. The situation in Florida Star
does not fall into this previously accepted category. Therefore, there is no issue of
whether the penumbral zone of privacy could be extended into this limited area of
the protection of sexual offense victims consistent with the first amendment's mandate for the freedom of the press. See Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor An Expanded Law of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965) (discussion of the effects of Griswold in the privacy arena).
The state of Florida sought to protect B.J.F. from a public disclosure of her unfortunate attack. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606. It can also be argued that the state
sought to protect her from false light publicity. Rape victims still carry a social
stigma and are subject to further humiliation and trial because of their "status" as
sexual offense victims. See infra note 99 for an explanation of the stigma surrounding
rape victims that still prevails in today's society. The Supreme Court did not evaluate
B.J.F's situation in a penumbral constitutional light, but rather as a state protected
right. Therefore, the justices did not consider the "zone of privacy" into which
B.J.F.'s interests might fall.
5. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 433 U.S. 97 (1978), in deciding FloridaStar. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609. In
Daily Mail, the Supreme Court invalidated a West Virginia statute that made it a
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prevent the media from publishing information in the public do7
main' absent a state interest of the highest order.
crime for a newspaper to publish a juvenile offender's identity without the written
approval of the juvenile court. Daily Mail, 433 U.S. at 98-99. The Court found the
state's interest in protecting and rehabilitating juvenile offenders did not validate
West Virginia's punitive action against the newspaper. Id. at 106.
The Court reasoned that the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings was not an
interest of the highest order because the protection of the juvenile must be considered along with the rights created by the first amendment. Id. at 104-05. Therefore,
the Court concluded that a constitutional right must prevail over a state's right to
protect juveniles. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Daily Mail Court relied on a
previous case, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Id. In Davis, a criminal defendant
sought to impeach a prosecution witness on the basis of the witness' juvenile record.
Davis, 415 U.S. at 308. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's sixth amendment rights must give way to the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of a
juvenile offender. Id. Thus, the protection of a juvenile offender, in this situation, was
a state interest of the highest order and justified restricting the defendant's sixth
amendment rights. Id.
In addition, the Daily Mail Court reasoned that even if West Virginia's asserted
interest met the highest order standard, the statute did not accomplish its stated
purpose. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105. Since West Virginia's statute did not restrict
the broadcasting media or any form of publication except newspapers, the statute was
not sufficiently tailored to accomplish the state's goal. Id. Furthermore, the state did
not present any evidence to demonstrate that imposing a penalty was necessary to
protect the confidentiality of its juvenile proceedings. Id.
6. It is difficult to define the parameters of the public domain because the Supreme Court has not put forth a clear cut definition. However, an examination of the
recognized legal definitions of its components is helpful. A domain is the sphere of

influence or realm of public control.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

434 (5th ed. 1979). The

adjective "public" means open to all; notorious; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. Id. at 1104. The Supreme Court has recognized certain areas of society to be included in the public domain. See generally Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (first amendment mandates open
criminal trials); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 97 (eyewitnesses at scene and police radio
monitoring); Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, Okla. Cnty., Okla., 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (pretrial hearings); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(courthouse records); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 33 (1966) (courtrooms and trials); Rape Trial on T.V. Gets Good Response, 8 THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW 45
(1984) ("vital to direct democracy to allow people to watch a jury ... handing down
verdict"). These areas are in addition to those already recognized under the freedom
of speech clause of the first amendment. See generally Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1976) (municipal theatres); Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (grounds near school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965) (streets in front of courthouse are public forum); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (state capitol grounds); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-24, at
986-97 (discussing public and semi-public forums).
7. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611-13. The phrase "a state interest of the highest order" usually is incorporated in the strict scrutiny test that the Supreme Court
employs in equal protection and due process cases involving discrimination. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (interracial marriage not grounds for
removal of child from mother's custody); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (no
prohibition permitted against interracial marriage); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate treatment is not equal treatment under the law);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invidious use of licensing requirement).
However, the Court also employs this test when a case involves a threat to a fundamental right. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (freedom to associate); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax violates right to suffrage); Cantwell v. Con-
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On October 20, 1983, B.J.F. s reported to the Duval County Florida Sheriff's Department ("Department") that she had been raped.
The Department prepared a report of the incident that included
B.J.F.'s full name.' It then placed the report in its press room. A
Florida Star'0 ("Star") reporter trainee copied the report verbatim"
12
to use in an article for the newspaper's "Police Reports" section.
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion). Since the fundamental right of the
freedom of the press was at issue in Florida Star, one must assume that the Court's
use of this term is meant to invoke the strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test
employed in other first amendment cases holds that in order for a state's action to
rise to an interest of the highest order, its purpose must be closely linked to the
burden it places on the fundamental right. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-13, at 1251
(discussing strict scrutiny under freedom of religion clause). If the government can
approximately attain its goal without burdening the fundamental right, then it must
follow that path regardless of how compelling the goal may be. Id. See also Cantwell,
310 U.S. at 296 (freedom of religion clause and strict scrutiny test).
8. All the trial court pleadings and the appellee's complaint refer to B.J.F. by
her full name. All papers filed with the Florida District Court of Appeal also refer to
her by name. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida, suo sponte, changed the
caption of the case to protect the appellee's anonymity. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So.
2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The appellant used this style in its briefs before the
Supreme Court and, therefore, this casenote will do the same. Brief for Appellant at
3, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 87-329) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. See also Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 87-329) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Statement] (note regarding use of initials in place of B.J.F.'s full name).
9. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2606 (1989). The Department settled
with B.J.F. for $2,500. Id. at 2606.
10. The Florida Star is a weekly newspaper that primarily serves the community of Jacksonville, Florida. Id. at 2605. It has an average circulation of 18,000 copies. Id. Typically, the newspaper runs a "Police Reports" section that contains brief
synopses of local criminal incidents awaiting police investigation. Id.
11. The Star relied on three witnesses to corroborate its position. The first witness, Jacqueline Lotson, testified that she was the reporter trainee responsible for
initially copying the police report. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 4. Ms. Lotson
acknowledged that signs denoting that the publication of a rape victim's identity is
illegal were posted in the press room. Id. She further acknowledged that she knew of
the newspaper's policy against this type of publication. Id.
Girtha Morgan, the staff writer who drafted the article for publication, testified
that she did not intend B.J.F.'s name to be printed. Id. at 4-5. Ms. Morgan also
testified that she was aware of the paper's policy prohibiting this type of publicity.
Brief for Appellee at 6, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (No. 87-329) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
Finally, the newspaper's unidentified managing editor, owner, and publisher, testified to the newspaper's policy against printing the names of sexual offense victims.
Id. at 7. The name of the managing editor was not included in any of the briefs
argued before the Supreme Court. However, this editor also testified that other persons in the newspaper's hierarchy had missed the error and violated the policy. Id. In
short, at least six people failed to catch the error and delete B.J.F.'s name from the
article.
12. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2605. The article in question read as follows:
[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park,
which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute to her bus stop, when
an unknown black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck
and told her not to yell. The suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual
intercourse with her before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch
and gold necklace. Patrol efforts have been suspended concerning this incident
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When the Star published the article identifying B.J.F. by name, it
violated" § 794.03 of the Florida Code ("Statute").4 This statute
prohibits the media from publishing the identity of a sexual offense
victim.' 6 In September, 1984, B.J.F. filed suit against the1 7 Department and the Star" for negligent violation of the statute.
At trial, B.J.F. asserted that she suffered emotional distress
from the publication of her name."s B.J.F. also stated that members
of her household received threatening phone calls after the Star
published her identity. 9 As a result, B.J.F. was forced to seek police
protection. 0 In its defense, the Star explained that it had learned
B.J.F.'s name from the Department's report. 1 At the conclusion of
the testimony, the Star moved for a directed verdict. The court denied this motion." The trial court found the Star negligent per se
because of lack of evidence.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 5.
13. See supra note 11 for a summary of the testimony of those newspaper employees who knew of the newspaper's policy against the publication of sexual offense
victims' names.
14. Section 794.03 provides:
No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed,
published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name,
address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual
offense within this chapter. An offense under this section shall constitute a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, §
775.083, or § 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987).
15. See supra note 14 for the complete statutory prohibitions.
16. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
17. B.J.F. filed a complaint alleging negligence and that the statute was used as
the standard of care for imposing liability. FloridaStar, 109 S. Ct. at 2617 (White, J.,
dissenting).
18. Id. at 2606. The transcript of the proceedings in the district court is unpublished, but parts were included in the briefs for the Appellant and Appellee to the
United States Supreme Court.
19. B.J.F. testified that she learned of the article in the Florida Star from her
fellow employees. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 5. See also Florida Star, 109
S. Ct. at 2606. While B.J.F. was recuperating in the hospital, a co-worker brought the
article to her attention. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 5. At this time, B.J.F.'s
mother, who was living at B.J.F.'s home caring for her children, received telephone
calls from a man who said he would rape B.J.F. again. Id. at 5-6. B.J.F. testified that
at the time of her attack, her phone number and address were listed in the telephone
directory. Id. at 5.
20. See supra note 19 for the incidents that occurred subsequent to the publication of B.J.F.'s identity. In addition to B.J.F.'s need for police protection, she was
compelled to seek psychiatric counseling after her name was published. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 6.
21. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2606 (1989) (publication of B.J.F.'s
name was "inadvertent").
22. The trial judge refused to grant either of the Star's two motions for directed
verdict. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606. Instead, the trial judge ruled that because
the statute struck the necessary balance between the first amendment and the right
to privacy, it was constitutional. Id. The judge was careful to point out that in this
case the statute was applied to a limited area of concern ("sensitive criminal offenses"). Id.
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based upon the Star's violation of the statute.23 The jury awarded
B.J.F. $100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.2 '
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the trial court's decision. 5 The appellate court concluded
that the published information was private in nature and, therefore,
the newspaper should not have published B.J.F.'s identity as "a
matter of law."2 6 The court further noted that the information fell
under the auspices of the statute.2
The Florida Supreme Court denied review, and the Star filed a
petition for certiorari.2 8 On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether the publication of a sexual
offense victim's name warranted constitutional protection. The
23. In its reply brief, the Star asserted that this decision was the equivalent of
strict liability because B.J.F.'s cause of action derived from a criminal statute. Brief
for Appellee, supra note 11, at 9, n.4. However, the cause of action was treated as a
common law action for the negligent invasion of privacy through the entire proceeding. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (appellate court
ruled on negligent invasion of privacy basis not on strict liability).
24. The judge granted B.J.F.'s motion for a directed verdict finding the Star
negligent per se. The only question left for the jury to consider was the issue of causation and damages. FloridaStar, 109 S.Ct. at 2606. The judge instructed the jury'to
consider whether the Star had "acted with reckless indifference to the rights of
others." Id. If they found this to be the case, the jury could award B.J.F. punitive
damages. Id. The jury awarded B.J.F. $25,000 in punitive damages and $75,000 in
compensatory damages. Id.
25. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). It is interesting to note that the appellate court unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision in less than three paragraphs.
26. Id. at 884. (citing Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., Inc.,
436 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
In Doe, the Florida appellate court held that first amendment rights should not
be exercised when "unnecessary" and "detrimental" to the rights of others. Doe v.
Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., Inc., 436 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983). The plaintiff in Doe was a rape victim who testified against her assailant.
The television station-defendant obtained her identity at trial. Doe, 436 So. 2d at 328.
Since a trial is a recognized public forum, the appellate court refused to impose damages on the television station. Id. at 330. However, the court pointed out that when
private persons are the subject of publicity because of their involuntary connection to
a newsworthy event, the judgment of the media cannot be absolute. Id. at 331. Moreover, the court reiterated that the first amendment right of the public to know is not
only for the protection of the press. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
This right is for the protection of the average citizen as well. Id. Therefore, both the
press' rights and those of the individual must be taken into consideration when a
private person is subject to unwanted publicity. Id. at 331.
27. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In
Florida Star, the appellate court concluded that the statute was applicable. However,
in Doe, the court concluded that the statute was inapplicable because a trial was a
form of public documentation. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co.,
Inc., 436 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
28. Before noting jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court certified to the
Florida Supreme Court the question whether it possessed jurisdiction when it declined to hear the Star's case. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607, n.4 (1989).
The Florida Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530
So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 1988).
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Court also considered the parallel issue of whether imposing damages upon a newspaper for publishing truthful information violated
the first amendment. 29 In balancing a state's interest to protect its
citizens against the press' right to print the truth, the Court held
that the state cannot infringe upon the freedom of the press, absent
a showing of a state interest of the highest order.30 The Court determined that protecting the rape victim's identity did not rise to this
29. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2605.
30. Id. at 2607. The Court based its conclusion on a trilogy of prior decisions
where states with similar statutes attempted to prohibit the media from publishing
the identity of certain individuals. The first case in this trilogy is Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). A reporter for Cox Broadcasting obtained the
name of a deceased rape victim from the indictment documents present at the trial of
her assailant. He broadcast the victim's identity on the evening news. Cox, 420 U.S.
at 472-73. The victim's father brought a damages action against Cox Broadcasting
pursuant to a Georgia Statute that prohibited the publication of a rape victim's identity. Id. at 474. The Supreme Court held that the press' role in subjecting trials to
public scrutiny thereby guaranteeing their fairness, outweighed the state's interest in
protecting the victim. Id. at 492.
Cox would seem to control in this case. However, the Supreme Court in Florida
Star distinguished Cox and held that it "cannot fairly be read as controlling here."
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (1989). In Cox, the father of the rape
victim, not the victim herself asserted a violation of his state protected right of privacy. Tragically, the victim died as a result of her attack. Moreover, the court documents contained her identity and were open to inspection by the general public during an adversarial proceeding. Court documents are always accessible to the general
public during a trial. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (trial
must be open to public in interest of accused's right to fair trial). See also Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings must yield to public interest in judiciary conduct); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (public right to know about "Pentagon Papers"). The Supreme Court in Florida Star pointed out that Cox could not
control the outcome because of these distinctions. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct.'at 2608.
Furthermore, the press' role in the fairness of public trials was not "compromised," as
no adversarial proceeding had begun. Id. at 2608.
The second case in the trilogy that the Supreme Court examined was Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court, Okla. Cnty., Okla., 430 U.S. 308 (1977). In
Oklahoma Publishing, a judge entered an order prohibiting the news media from
publishing a juvenile murder suspect's identity and picture. Oklahoma Publishing,
430 U.S. at 308-09. The trial judge entered this order after an open detention hearing
at which the media was present. Id. at 309.
Relying on its earlier decision in Cox, the Supreme Court held that once information is publicly revealed in connection with a crime or hearing, a trial judge cannot
suppress its publication. Id. at 310. However, it did note that the judge could have
availed himself of the opportunity to prohibit media attendance at the initial detention hearing. Id. at 311. See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609-10
(1989) (discussion of Oklahoma Publishing). In Florida Star, the Court did not specifically say that Oklahoma Publishing did not control the outcome of the case. However, in light of the fact that it also concerned public trials, which were not an issue
in Florida Star, Oklahoma Publishing could not fairly be seen as controlling the case
either.
The final case the Court examined was Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979). See supra note 5 for the Court's examination and subsequent reliance
on the principles in Daily Mail. The Supreme Court determined that of the three
cases in the trilogy, Daily Mail specifically controlled the litigation in Florida Star.
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609. Cox and Oklahoma Publishingwere used as support.
Id.
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standard;31 therefore, the damages imposed on the Star were
unjustified.32
The Court began its analysis by discussing the principles established in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company.s In Daily Mail,
the United States Supreme Court held that before a state may punish a newspaper for publishing a juvenile delinquent's name, it must
demonstrate that its action was necessary to further the state interests asserted. 4 In examining these interests, the Supreme Court
identified three considerations that supported its findings in Daily
Mail: (1) the media must obtain information lawfully to be afforded
protection; (2) the remedy must advance a state interest of the highest order; and (3) the remedy must not promote self suppression by
the media. 5
The Court first inquired whether the Star published lawfully
obtained information. 6 The Court defined lawfully obtained information as information available to the general public or information
of great public significance.37 If information is in the public domain,
31. The Court noted that the protection of a rape victim was a "significant"
interest although it failed to rise to the higher standard of a state interest of the
highest order. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611. However, the Court did not put forth
any test to explain the shortcomings of the appellee's argument.
32. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
33. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the decision in Daily Mail.
34. Smith v. Daily Mail Pubishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979). The Daily Mail
Court noted that its holding was narrow. In addition, the Court noted that there was
no issue of privacy or unlawful press access to confidential proceedings before the
Court. Id. However, the Supreme Court in Florida Star seemed to disregard this
warning. It decided that Daily Mail controlled the Florida Star litigation even
though Daily Mail did not specifically confront an invasion of privacy situation.
35. FloridaStar, 109 S. Ct. at 2609. Daily Mail does not expressly set out these
three criteria as a test for "balancing" competing first amendment and privacy interests. But see Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (if newsapaper legally procures truthful information of public importance, publication is not
punishable absent state interest of highest order). However, these criteria are implied
by prior decisions as well as by the facts of Daily Mail. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
1
469 (1975).
36. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989).
37. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610. The Court linked the definition of legally
obtained information to the definition of public domain. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the public domain. This definition is inconsistent with the Court's previously recognized forums under the freedom of speech clause.
The Court has recognized three categories of public forums. These categories are:
(1) places which have been traditionally devoted to speech, such as streets and parks;
(2) state created semi-public forums, such as university campuses or school board
meetings; and (3) public property which is not by tradition or designation open to the
public. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). See
also L. TRIaE, supra note 1, § 12-24 (discussion of Perry and public forums).
This formula adapts easily for use as a definition of legally obtained information.
Any information received from places traditionally open to the public (category 1) or
places specifically opened to the public by the states (category 2) would be legally
obtained. However, information received from sources or places not traditionally accessible to the general public or from places forbidden to the general public would be

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:731

it is presumed to have been published lawfully. The majority concluded that because the Department released B.J.F.'s name without
restrictions, 8 this information was in the public domain and, therefore, had been lawfully obtained. Thus, the state could not punish
the Star for publishing B.J.F.'s name."
Furthermore, the majority concluded that the information contained in the report was a matter of great public significance.4 The
Court found the crime and its subsequent investigation by the police
to be of "paramount" public concern mandating publication. 1 In
addition, the Court found the information was unqualified and,
illegally obtained. However, the Court has denied access to the press in certain forums, even though the information imparted at this forum is of public significance
and news gathering might be hampered. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(newspaper man cannot invoke reporter's privilege and refuse to testify at grand jury
hearing). See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (restricting access of the
press to trial is possible when defendant's right to an impartial trial is in jeopardy).
However, in Florida Star, the Court allowed its determination of the public domain to include the significance of the information obtained. Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
109 S.Ct. 2603, 2611 (1989). This addition allows information that falls into the third
category to slip through the cracks of legality if it is of great public importance. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, if it can be found that
the information under investigation can somehow be classified as part of the public
domain, it will be deemed lawfully obtained regardless of whether the press or the
public actually had access to the information's source.
38. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610. The Court concentrated on the fact that,
although there were signs in the press room warning against publishing B.J.F.'s identity, the Department gave the Star the information. Id. at 2611. The Court's reasoning suggests that since the Department allowed B.J.F.'s full name to be published, its
action nullified the warnings in the signs. Id. at 2610-11. In other words, if one person
fails to follow the warning signs, then no one else can be accountable for following
them either. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2616 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting).
39. B.J.F. contended that under Florida law police reports are not open to the
public for inspection, therefore, the information contained in them is not part of the
public domain and cannot be legally obtained. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at
12, 17-18. The Court emphasized that the Star obtained the data from the Department after it had inadvertently failed to follow the policy of the statute. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975)). Moreover, the Court cited cases where the inability of the government to
police itself prevented the state from imposing liability on the media. See, e.g.,
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (internal procedures
should be employed to protect confidentiality); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, Okla. Cnty., Okla., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (judge failed to avail himself of opportunity to use procedure to close juvenile hearing). But see, e.g., Seattle Times Co, v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (restraint on publication of discovered information upheld); Application of KTSP Television v. Ming Sen Shive, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn.
1980) (media not permitted to publish tapes of rape because would impinge upon
privacy rights of victim).
40. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611. The majority examined the importance of
reporting a crime such as rape and concluded that the commission and investigation
of a violent crime was a matter of "paramount public import." Id. However, they did
not specifically address the importance (or lack of importance) attached to the victim's name. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the requirements for the public
domain.
41. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2611 (1989).
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therefore, the Star could assume the state was serving the public
interest by releasing it.4 Since only information in the public domain is legally obtained and information of great public significance
is part of that domain, the Court concluded the Star lawfully obtained B.J.F.'s identity."'
Next, the Court inquired into the appellee's contention that imposing liability for publishing information furthered a state interest
of the highest order." The appellee referred to three concerns in
supporting her argument: (1) the privacy of the victims; (2) the protection of the victim's physical safety; and (3) the need to encourage
victims to report sexual offenses without fear of exposure.45 The
Court found that, although these interests were "significant," they
were not interests of the highest order."6 Therefore, imposing liability upon the Star for publishing a victim's identity did not meet the
47
Daily Mail criteria and could not be upheld.
The Court then turned to an examination of the statute to determine whether it properly served the state's asserted purpose. 8
42. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 495 (1975)). The Court cited to Cox as a reminder that when information is
in a recognized public domain, the press can presume that the state intended to serve
the public interest in releasing this information. Id. at 2610. However, the quote relied on by the Court only mentions court records as an incident when the media may
presume this conclusion. Id. at 2610. The report in Florida Star had not yet been
made a part of a court record.
43. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610. See supra notes 6 and 38 for a discussion of
the Court's definition of the public domain and its subsequent affect on the legality
of obtained information.
44. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
45. Id. See also Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 29-30.
46. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611. The Court did not put forth any test to
explain the shortcomings of the appellee's arguments. See infra note 99 and accompanying text for the ramifications of this lack of analysis.
47. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
48. Id. at 2611-12. The trial court applied a negligence per se standard because
of the statute's violation. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989) (White,
J., dissenting). However, the standard was not provided for in the statute. See supra
note 14 for full text of the statute. The appellate court upheld this standard. Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). However, the Supreme Court
was concerned with the fact that the standard was achieved legislatively, not judicially in this situation, because a statute was used to determine the standard of review. Florida Star v. B.J.F, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989).
The Court emphasized the statute's failure to require a case-by-case analysis and
its lack of a scienter requirement. Id. at 2612-13. The Court concluded that the language of the statute did not require an examination of the circumstances surrounding
the publication of a victim's identity for a violation to occur. Id. at 2613. Without
these two prerequisites, the Court determined that the statute failed to advance a
narrowly tailored state interest of the highest order. Id. at 2613. See generally Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (statute requiring mandatory,
rather than case-by-case examination, does not meet state interest of the highest order test); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (statute prohibiting
only newspapers, but not all members of media, does not further a state interest of
the highest order); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 14-13 (discussing state interest of highest
order).
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The Court addressed the statute's underinclusiveness and its relation to the state's interest in protecting sexual offense victims.49 The
statute only prohibits "instrument[s] of mass communication" from
disseminating information." The Court reasoned that a more inclusive definition prohibiting all means of publication was necessary to
"evenhandedly" advance the state's purpose. 1 Because the statute
did not prohibit alternative forms of dissemination, 2 the Court concluded that the statute did not fully achieve its stated purpose. 3
Finally, the Court cursorily inquired into whether self suppression would result from imposing liability on the media." The Court
cited cases supporting its belief that imposing liability would cause
self censorship among the media. 5 The Court reaffirmed the position that once information is lawfully obtained a newspaper should
not have the burden of pruning out unlawful material."
49. See supra note 48 for the Court's analysis of the standards applied to the
statute.
50. See supra note 14 for the full text of the statute.
51. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613. The Court was concerned that the statute
did not extend its provisions to the "smalltime [sic] disseminator." Id. The majority
believed that the statute's inability to be used against the local gossip prevented it
from accomplishing its stated purpose. Id. However, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court implied that a statute that applied to all forms of the media
equally would advance sufficiently the purported state interest and survive judicial
scrutiny. Daily Mail, 433 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979).
52. The Court was concerned that the statute did not provide a-remedy against
the local gossip. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613. However, the majority did not examine the whole of Florida privacy tort law. Id. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting). Florida recognizes the tort of publication of private facts. See, e.g., Cape Publications,
Inc. v. Hitchner, 544 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (setting
forth elements of publication of private facts tort). Thus, as Justice White pointed
out in his dissent, the local gossip would be subject to the same liability as the Star.
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2617.
53. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989).
54. Id. at 2610. The Court did not devote much discussion to the issue of media
self censorship. However, it noted that a newspaper should be able to rely on the
"government's implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination." Id. at
2610. Again, this argument ignores the qualified nature of the information and its
admission into the public domain. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the Court's
definition of a public domain.
55. In particular, the majority cited its discussion of overdeterrence in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), as support for its belief that
imposing liability on the media would promote self censorship. Accord Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (media cannot be denied right to
print certain information in transcript of court proceedings); Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (prohibition of media would not advance confidentiality of juvenile proceedings).
56. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2610 (1989). See generally Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (media cannot be denied right
to print information discovered in transcript of court proceeding); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (media does not have duty to suppress information discovered in open court); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (public right to know about "Pentagon Papers").
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In Florida Star, the Court correctly held that a state cannot
prohibit the publication of truthful information, in general.5 7 Its
analysis and ruling of the case, however, were incorrect. The Court
failed to establish workable guidelines to achieve a balance between
state protected privacy interests and truthful reporting." Consequently, it is difficult to determine when a state interest will sufficiently outweigh the media's publication right." Three areas of the
Court's analysis prevented the Court from adopting workable guidelines. First, the Court incorrectly interpreted the standard of liability established in the statute as well as its specified purpose. 0 Second, the Court failed to distinguish between information accessible
to the public and that provided to the press exclusively. Finally, the
Court failed to find that the state's interest in protecting the identity of sexual offense victims was a state interest of the highest
order.
First, the Court incorrectly interpreted the standard of liability
established by the statute because it narrowly focused on the statute's language and not its application. 1 While the statute itself does
not contain language delineating a standard, the Florida courts have
interpreted the statute to require a higher standard of liability than
that previously adopted by the Supreme Court. 2 In Gertz v. Robert
57. The first amendment does not allow a government to infringe upon the freedom of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has consistently and
correctly upheld -this mandate in situations involving defamation, political conduct,
and public records. See e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (defamation); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Garrison v. Louisiana., 379
U.S. 64 (1964) (political conduct); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975) (court records).
Justice White, in his dissent, argued that the majority based its decision upon
excessive deference to a free press. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2676, n.2. He asserted
that the Court's concern for a free press must be balanced against the competing
interests of a humane society. Id. He stated that "an absolutist view of the former
leads to insensitivity as to the latter." Id. Justice White was also concerned with the
Court's reluctance to impose the requisite responsibility that accompanies a constitutional freedom upon the press. Id.
58. In Florida Star, as in previous decisions, the Court advocated a need to
balance state protected privacy interests with the guarantees of the first amendment.
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606-13. However, it again failed to address the ultimate
question of when, and how, a state interest can trump the first amendment's prohibition 59.
against
infringing upon the freedom of the press.
Since
the Court failed to address the issue of when a state interest sufficiently can outweigh the freedom of the press, it neglected to propose any clear guidelines toward achieving that end. See supra note 57 for Justice White's view on the
proper balance of these competing interests.
60. See supra notes 14 and 48 for the full text of the statute and the Court's
examination of its requirements.
61. See supra note 14 for the full text of the statute.
62. The Florida courts have determined that a standard of "reckless indifference" is necessary to impose liability under the statute. See generally Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989) (upholding reckless indifference
standard); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App. 1983) (television station did not breach standard since information was
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Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that ordinary negligence is the
minimum constitutional standard for imposing liability on the media." In applying the statute, the Florida courts require a higher
constitutional standard of negligence, namely "reckless indifference," before imposing liability.6 4 Historically, the Court has considered both language and application when balancing the interests involved. 5 However, in Florida Star, the Court failed to follow its
previous course of action.
Furthermore, while the language of the statute is precisely tailored to prevent widespread dissemination of private information,66
obtained at open court proceeding); Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert denied, 153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963) (newspaper charged with
knowledge of statutory provisions).
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Court examined a private individual's claim against a newspaper for defamation. An article
appeared in a newspaper owned by Robert Welch, Inc., that linked Gertz with criminal activity and the Communist movement. Id. at 326. The Supreme Court found
that a private person was more susceptible to injury from defamation than a public
figure because he has less access to the media. Id. at 343-45. Moreover, the Court
found that, so long as the states do not impose liability without fault, the states may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability necessary for imposing liability on the media. Id. at 347-48. In addition, the Court established ordinary negligence as the minimum constitutional standard necessary to comply with the mandates of the first amendment. Id. at 348-50. See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct.
2603, 2612 (1989) (Court's discussion of ordinary negligence under Gertz); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 2:08(c)-(e) (Supp. 1989) (discussion of Gertz and the scope of the

press); J. BARRON

&

C. DIENES,

HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS

§§ 6:22,

7:1-2 (1980) (discussion of Gertz and the privacy interest in general).
64. Reckless indifference in publication exists when there is sufficient evidence
to permit a jury to conclude that the media defendant entertained serious doubts

about the credibility of its informant.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1142 (5th ed. 1979).

At trial, the jury concluded that the Star acted with reckless indifference toward the
rights of others when it published B.J.F.'s identity because the Star was aware of the
statutory prohibition on disclosure. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2606
(1989).
65. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court examined the specific language employed in the statute before invalidating it completely. Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979). Furthermore, the Court has looked at the
legislature's intent, as well as the statute's application, to determine if an unreasonable burden has been placed upon a penumbral right. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (injunction against future
publication not an invalid prior restraint).
The majority of the cases where the Court upheld a statute that restricted a
penumbral right dealt with the equal protection and due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Congress had
latitude to try new techniques that may burden right of equal protection to reach
remedial objectives); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (Court examined effect and application of university's affirmative action admission policy). The Court upheld a burden on the fourteenth amendment but has
not pursued this course in cases concerning the first amendment. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (closure order invalidated in criminal trial even though publicity surrounding trial potentially prejudicial to defendant).
66. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Supreme Court suggested that
states wishing to protect privacy rights may "respond [to the challenge] by means
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the majority held that the statute was facially underinclusive" In
past decisions, the Court has found statutes underinclusive only
when they fail to extend the prohibitions to all sectors of the mass
media. " However, in Florida Star, the Court found the statute underinclusive for failing to prohibit the town gossip from disseminating information. The Court has never invalidated a statute for failing to advance absolutely its purported interest.70 In this case,
however, the Supreme Court refused to accept anything less than an
absolute prohibition on all forms of dissemination.
Second, the Court failed to recognize that the information concerning B.J.F.'s rape was not in the public domain 1 and, therefore,
was not legally obtained. Information in the public domain is acceswhich avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information." Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1979). Justice White, in his dissent in
Florida Star, argued that the state of Florida has done everything possible to comply
with the Court's suggestion in Cox. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2616. Since additional
areas of Florida tort law would cover offenders other than the media, Justice White
suggested that this statute is indeed narrowly tailored to deal with the specific area of
media offenders. Id. at 2616. See supra notes 51-52 for a discussion of the liability of
the local gossip and other non-media offenders. Furthermore, Justice White noted
that the neighborhood gossip does not pose a threat of intrusion to a rape victim
because his publishing ability is severely limited when compared to the mass media.
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2617.
67. When a statute is inclusive it "embrace[s] [and] comprehend[s] . . . the

stated limits or extremes."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

687 (5th ed. 1979). Section

794.03 was established to embrace the limits of the media's right to publish information. See Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983). This Florida law covers the form, content, nature, and purpose of
every sector of mass communication. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2617
(1989) (White, J., dissenting). It was not intended to cover other forms of dissemination. Id. at 2617.
68. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979) (statute did
not achieve purpose because it did not restrict the electronic media or any form of
publication except
newspapers).
69. See supra notes 51-52 for a discussion of the Court's concern about the local
gossip.
70. At the outset of the FloridaStar case, the Court noted the issue was one of
balancing competing interests. Florida Star, 109 S.Ct. at 2604. The Court's emphasis
on an absolute prohibition in the statute against every conceivable form of publicity
accorded too little weight to the rape victim's privacy side of the balancing scale. Id.
at 2618 (White, J., dissenting). Research has not revealed any cases that adhere to the
rule that a statute must absolutely advance its purported end. Absolute legislation
must be complete and perfect within itself. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9 (5th ed. 1979).
As the Court has recognized in equal protection cases, legislatures need not enact
perfect legislation, just legislation narrowly tailored to achieve its stated end. See
generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Congress can burden equal protection to reach remedial objectives); Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative action in university admission upheld); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal protection not
violated when tax system used to fund school district); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (use of gender descriptions
in "want ads" not violation of sex discrimination statute).
71. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the public domain.
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sible to the public without need for special clearance. 2 Because access to the information is not restricted, courts assume that it was
legally obtained. Information in the public domain is clearly distinguishable from qualified information.7" Qualified information is restricted, and its dissemination is limited. Therefore, only a select
person or group can legally obtain qualified information."'
In this case, B.J.F.'s name was only made available to members
of the press. The Florida legislature expected the press to be aware
of the statute's prohibition against publishing a rape victim's
name.7" Furthermore, numerous warning signs against this type of
publicity were posted in the Department's press room as an added
precaution.7 1 While the Star admitted it was aware of these warnings and the prohibitions contained in the statute, the Court refused
to acknowledge the qualified nature of B.J.F.'s identity.7 7
The Court reasoned that the state can keep information out of
the public domain by classifying the informations7 8 which is the very
action the Department took in this case. The Department only released B.J.F.'s name to persons charged with knowledge of the privileged nature of a sexual offense victim's identity.7 9 In prior cases,

the Florida courts have charged the media with knowledge of the
statute's prohibitions.8 The general public, on the other hand, has
not been held accountable for the statute's provisions. The fact that
72. Public is defined as that which is not limited to a particular sector of the
community. Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418, 423 (Dist. Ct. Ga. 1972).
See supra note 6 for a discussion of the public domain.
73. The Court distinguished public information from qualified information
when it held that a state could classify information to-protect its dissemination. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989). In its analysis, the Court recognized a
need for clearance to access qualified information. Id. at 2612. Thus, if clearance is
needed, the information cannot be part of the public domain. Id.
74. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (public and press
regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings and meetings of other official bodies);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (press excluded if necessary to assure fair
trial to defendant).
75. See Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 514 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (accredited news agencies must be aware of statutes prohibiting publication);
Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963) (newspaper charged with knowledge of statutes prohibiting
publication).
76. See supra notes 11 and 38 for a discussion of the presence of warning signs
in the press room and the Star's awareness of same.
77. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2610-11 (1989) (Court refused to acknowledge qualified nature of B.J.F.'s identity).
78. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609. Justice White, dissenting, argued that this
procedure was exactly the same as Florida's procedure when it enacted this statute.
Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
. 79. Only the press have been held accountable for knowledge of the statute's
prohibitions. See supra note 75 for a sample of cases imposing knowledge of the statute's prohibitions upon the media. There is no issue in this case regarding releasing
B.J.F.'s identity to the general public.
80. See supra note 75 for the media's knowledge of the statute's prohibitions.
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only members of the press had access to the police reports strongly
demonstrates that this information was classified and, therefore, not
in the public domain.81 According to the Court's own analysis, information not present in the public domain cannot be legally
obtained. 2
Furthermore, in prior cases the Court defined areas that are
part of the public domain. 3 Areas that the Court previously recognized include judicial proceedings," court records, 5 police radio reports, 6 and eyewitness testimony. 7 In each of these situations, the
public could obtain access to the information either by witnessing
the event or through verbal or written request. In the present case,
B.J.F.'s identity was not available to the public by any of the previously recognized avenues.8 8 In effect, the Court extended protection
to non-public domains. According to the Court's analysis, any information that the media receives becomes part of the public domain
and, therefore, is legally obtainable.8 8 Consequently, if a state's classification efforts fail and the press gains access to classified information, the state may never refute the press' contention that it obtained the information legally. 0
81. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
82. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2610-11 (1989). See supra notes 6
and 37 for a discussion on lawfully obtained information and the public domain.
83. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the public domain.
84. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (closure
order invalidated even though open trial might prejudice defendant); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (media, in attendance at commission hearing, may publish divulged information); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966) (press allowed broad scope in publicity surrounding trial proceedings).
85. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (pre-trial publicity
does not lead to unfair trial); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(information contained in indictment documents open to public). But see Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (discovery evidence not allowed to be
published); Application of KSTP Televison v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D.
Minn. 1980) (publication of videotape evidence of rape attack infringes upon victim's
privacy right).
86. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (newspaper
learned of incident by monitoring police radio); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (West Supp. 1989)
(definition of accessibility of radio communication to public); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511g
(West Supp. 1989) (not unlawful for person to intercept radio communications).
87. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 97 (newspaper learned of offender's identity by
speaking to eyewitnesses at scene).
88. B.J.F.'s identity was only available through the Department's report. The
Department could not release this information to the public. FLA. STAT. § 794.03
(1987).
89. The Court held that the information the Star received was unqualified.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S.Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989). Furthermore, it held that the
media should not have to bear the burden of pruning the information it receives. Id.
Therefore, it follows that if the media is given truthful information, they have the
ability to publish the information without liability. Id. But see Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964) (Court hypothesizes that if national security were in jeopardy,
media's ability to publish would be curtailed).
90. The Court's reasoning was circular. It defined information in the public do-
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Since the Court failed to address the distinction between information in the public domain and qualified information, it did not
answer the question whether qualified information can ever be kept
out of the public domain.9' The Court suggested that a state may
classify information to protect its dissemination. However, the Court
failed to provide any guidelines to prevent the media from publishing this information when classification efforts fail.
Finally, the Court erred in failing to find the state's interest in
protecting the identity of sexual offense victims an interest of the
highest order. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court made a distinction between the public significance of publishing information3
concerning the rape itself and that of publishing the victim's name.
The Court took the view, however, that the public's right to the information far outweighed a state protected right to privacy."' This
position failed to give adequate consideration and importance to the
state's authority to protect its citizens and their right to privacy. 5
The Court's prior decisions, particularly in the area of discrimination, have recognized the state's authority to protect the significant interests of its citizens. 6 However, the Supreme Court refused
to recognize this authority when its exercise concerned the protecmain as legally obtained information and legally obtained information as information
in the public domain. This circular definition does little to aid state legislatures. See
supra notes 6 and 37 for the Court's definition of public domain and legally obtained
information.
91. The Court, by its own admission, has been avoiding the question of whether
qualified information can be kept out of the public domain. See Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607 (1989) (court resolved conflict only as arose in "discrete
factual context"); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979) (narrow
holding); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)(focusing on narrower question of privacy of public records).
92. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the strict scrutiny test.
93. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
94. Id. at 2610. Justice White, in his dissent, argued that the Court's decision
has effectively "obliterated" the right to privacy. Id. at 2618. He argued that the Bill
of Rights did not give the public a right to pry into the unnewsworthy private affairs
of their fellowmen. Id. (citing Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976)).
95. Historically, courts attempted to protect victims from invasive publicity in
sexual offense cases. See Application of KSTP Television v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F.
Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980) (television station not allowed to broadcast videotape of
rape attack); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal.
1971) (no social value in publishing victim's identity). In some instances, that same
protection has been afforded to potential offenders as well. See United States Dep't
of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989) (FBI
not entitled to "rap" sheet on person suspected of bribing senators); United States ex
rel Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977) (public excluded from trial to
prevent prejudice to defendant); Note, Access to Taped Evidence: Bringing the Picture Into Focus, 71 GEO. L.J. 193 (1983) (press should have access to taped evidence).
96. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (state had legitimate interest
in protecting the quality of its schools); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
(Court upheld California's statute disenfranchising convicted felons).
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tion of a sexual offense victim. 9 7 In Florida Star, the Court dealt
with protecting citizens from physical harm, not protecting their
rights to equality or to attend public events that were dealt with in
previous cases.9 8 By publishing a rape victim's name, the media
jeopardizes the victim's life and gives her assailant the opportunity
to discover her whereabouts. 9 However, the Court did not seem to
97. The Court refused to allow a state to use its police power to prohibit the
publication of B.J.F.'s identity. However, in the past, the Court has allowed the states
to invoke this power to advance other state protected rights, such as the right to vote,
to receive an education, and to obtain employment. See supra notes 7, 66, and 95 for
the equal protection and due process cases that upheld a state's police power.
98. In prior "state interest of the highest order" cases, the Court concerned itself with the free exchange of information and the public's right to know. See Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (public and press have right of
access to criminal trials); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, Okla. Cnty.,
Okla., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (once a pretrial is open to the public and press, it must
remain open); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (courts are open
to public). None of these prior cases dealt with the potential physical harm of a person if the public had access to the person's identity. See infra note 99 for a discussion
on the danger of reporting a rape victim's identity.
99. Rape is the ultimate violation of an individual, short of homicide. Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). There is no social value in disclosing the rape victim's identity. Any such disclosure could affect detrimentally the rape victim for
years to come. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 331
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See, e.g., R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 90-101
(1984) (history of traditional and contemporary definitions and beliefs surrounding
the crime of rape); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61

L. REV. 919 (1975) (rape laws based on traditional attitudes about sexual roles
and mores in society). B.J.F. raised three concerns in support of her argument that
the protection of a sexual offense victim should rise to the level of a state interest of
the highest order.
B.J.F.'s first concern was in regard to the privacy of the victim. Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2611 (1989) (citing Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 2930). The rape victim feels as if she has lost her dignity when she is raped. J. TEMKEN,
RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 1-6 (1987) (account of victim's psychological state after
rape). See also United States ex rel Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977)
(rape is both physical and psychological intrusion, and society should attach the
deepest sense of privacy to this intrusion); T. McCAHILL, L. MEYER, AND A. FISCHMAN,
THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 39-46 (1979) (information on the vital statistics of rape victims); L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 89-95 (1977)
(factors which affect classification of rape as crime); J. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS
AND THEIR VICTIMS 3-21 (1971) (discussion of scope of crime and its prevalence in all
strata of society). Many victims refuse to inform their families of the attack because
of the social stigma attached to the crime. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE
RAPE VICTIM 185-86 (1979). See also CLARK, supra, at 147-58 (society's view of the
victim); S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 209-41 (1982) (discussion of battered women and analysis of why sexual offense crimes continue in United States).
Even today, society continues to live under the belief that a rape victim somehow
"asked for it." CLARK, supra, at 121. See also H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE
54 (1980) (66% of society polled felt a rape victim asked to be abused). It is difficult
enough to recover from this violent crime. However, publishing the victim's identity
to the general public can make recovery almost impossible. MCCAHILL, supra, at 2139 (victims' accounts of adjustment period after attack and changes in behavior due
to attack). See also S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 387420 (victim's accounts of their attacks and the reactions of society). For example, the
victim may be subjected to countless questions from newsminded citizens who read
CALIF.

about her in the paper. Id. See also Court Reporting and Open Justice, 138 NEW
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place much emphasis on these considerations. It did not consider
the state's ability to protect a victim's identity separate from the
information concerning the nature of the crime. Therefore, the
Court left the states without any workable guidelines to determine
when protecting the physical integrity of its citizens can fulfill the
state interest of the highest order requirement.
LAW J. 909 (1988) (discussion of conflict between open courtroom proceedings and
victim's difficulties during trial). Psychologists recognize the need for a cloak of anonymity during which the victim can attempt to function as though her life had not
been interrupted. MCCAHILL, supra, at 73-79. Publicizing the victim's identity robs
her of this cloak and leaves her without the protective shell of privacy that other
citizens possess. See TEMKEN, supra, at 6-8 (victim in court and treatment once infor-

mation revealed).
B.J.F.'s second and perhaps most important concern, involved the physical protection of the rape victim. Rape is the one crime that has steadily increased in incidence over the past two decades. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES & CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975) [hereinafter LEAA REPORT] (prepared
by L. Brodyaga, M. Gates, S. Singer, M. Tucker, and R. White). Rape victims live in
fear that their assailants will retaliate if they report the attack to the authorities.
Katz, supra, at 186. Moreover, the number of repeat attacks has increased in recent
years. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (1989) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]; LEAA REPORT, supra, at 1. Thus, the publication of a rape victim's identity directly threatens
her physical safety by providing the assailant with the information necessary to complete his initial attack or harass the victim into not testifying. See supra notes 19-20
for a report of the events that occurred subsequent to B.J.F.'s attack. See also KATZ,
supra, at 186 (reasons for delay or non-reporting of rape); MACDONALD, supra, at 7071 (discussing techniques used by rapist to prevent detection).
Finally, B.J.F. expressed her concern over the need to encourage victims to report their attacks. Most rapes in the United States go unreported. KATZ, supra, at
186. See also S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 15-26 (1987) (discussing response of legal system
to rape report); E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM 9 (1976) (between 50% and 90% of
rape cases not reported). There are various reasons given for the failure to report the
rape. Among these reasons are: (1) fear of retaliation; (2) social stigma; and (3) mistrust of government agencies and the media. KATZ, supra, at 185-86. See also FEILD &
BIENEN, supra, at 54 (large number of population attribute rape crime to womanvictim); MACDONALD, supra, at 70-71 (discussing rapist's threats of retaliation); McCAHILL, supra, at 103 (discussion of police and credibility of victims). In many cases,
the police and government agencies are insensitive to the needs of the victim. KATZ,
supra, at 192-96. See also Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 928 (1973) (factors that cause police to consider rape "unfounded"). Police either refuse to pursue the attack as rape and attempt to classify it
as some lesser, easier to prove offense, or they ignore the instance all together and try
to convince the victim that it "really wasn't rape." MCCAHILL, supra, at 107-12. See
also CLARK, supra, at 147-59 (discussing "art" of victim blaming). Furthermore, most
victims distrust the media and fear that their lives will be turned into a public event.
See MCDONALD, supra, at 26 (victims fear newspapers and publicity). Considering the
media's handling of victims at trial, this fear is not unfounded. Rape victims who
have testified as trials against their assailants, reported that the trial was like being
raped a second time due to the media's mishandling of this sensitive situation.
TEMKEN, supra, at 7 (three victims likened the ordeal of a trial to "bring crucified").
See also BROWNMILLER, supra, at 412-20 (discussion of legal treatment of rape and
jury expectations at trial). For various books and articles on the psychological and
physical impact of rape, see, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); S. BROWNMILLER, supra.
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The Florida Star decision reflects the Court's belief that competing interests must be balanced. However, this decision does not
advance any workable guidelines to determine when a state protected interest can overcome the public's right to receive information. Rather than deciding the ultimate question of when the right
to privacy will outweigh the freedom of the press, the Court slides to
the "bottom of the slippery slope"1 ' in the protection of individual
rights. While the Court insisted that its holding is narrow,"' its impact on victims' rights with regard to media publication is significant. A state can no longer protect the anonymity of a sexual offense
victim who may seek its assistance in apprehending her assailant.
Instead, the victim must rely on the media for protection.' 2
Barbara Lynn Pedersen

100. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2619 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
101. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613.
102. Perhaps this reliance on the media to protect an individual's rights would
be easier to accept if the Court took the advice of Benjamin Franklin. "The press
should have the freedom to publish what it likes, so long as the public has the freedom to break the editor's pate." H. PURVIS, THE PRESS: FREE AND RESPONSIBLE? 30
(1982).

